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SPEECH
The New Europe
Jeane J Kirkpatrick *t
Thank you for the warm welcome. I am very pleased to be here and to
speak about foreign affairs in a time of change. As Adam said to Eve
as they left the Garden of Eden, "We are living in a time of transition,"
so are we too living in a time of transition.
The framework that has shaped world affairs since World War II is
creaking and cracking like an iceberg. It is about to disintegrate. That
framework for world affairs was shaped largely by the United States and
the Soviet Union in the years following World War II. Then, those pow-
ers were much stronger than others. They were polar opposites in a bipo-
lar world. A divided Europe was organized around these two powers.
Now this framework is changing.
New powers are challenging the near monopoly of influence and sta-
tus in the world. Japan is just one of these powers; the European com-
munity is another. Newly industrialized countries, such as those in the
Pacific Rim, are also challenging the United States and the Soviet Union.
The rise of these new powers has led to a decline of the influence of-both
the United States and the Soviet Union in parts of the world where they
have previously been deeply engaged.
Today, fundamental changes in the framework within which inter-
national affairs have taken place are well advanced. One of the most
dramatic examples of this change is the emergence of the European Com-
munity. The European Community has existed for decades, but it is still
growing in both breadth and depth while becoming progressively more
important. Austria, for example, has applied for membership and it is
generally expected that it will be accepted. Turkey and Morocco also
applied, but neither was accepted.
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Meanwhile, the European Community serves as a magnet for the
countries of Eastern Europe. East Germany passes its products into the
European Community by way of the Federal Republic, and the influence
of the European Community passes back into East Germany by way of
the Federal Republic. A former Austrian Foreign Minister told me re-
cently that Austria had been approached by representatives of Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary asking, if after its admission to the European
Community, Austria would be willing to serve as a funnel for their prod-
ucts as the Federal Republic does for East Germany. The former Aus-
trian Foreign Minister said he told his Czech and Hungarian
interlocutors, "Let us wait and see. That is a bit premature." But it is
not premature to say that the influence of the European Community is
already very important. The countries who comprise it are strong, rich,
and have growing influence. Also, most of the best friends of the United
States are members of that particular club.
The European Community is still taking shape. It is not known yet
whether it will become a single nation with a single currency, full-scale
economic integration, one parliament, and one set of laws as some people
think it might, or whether it will remain a union of sovereign states that
unite for some specific purposes (e.g. trading goods and bargaining for
access to other markets while maintaining their own identity and sover-
eignty in their own countries). The latter is Mrs. Thatcher's vision, but
she is not the only European leader who is very interested in maintaining
her country's distinctive personality. The United States and the Soviet
Union can do little to influence the process one way or the other; both
must wait and see how it comes out. How it evolves will be important
for the members of the European Community and us all.
More dramatic changes are underway in the other half of Europe
where innovations are announced almost daily. Actual change and
promises of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will have a
cumulative impact on the way those countries are and will be governed.
The pace of change is rapid.
In Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia people are speaking their own lan-
guages, singing their own songs, and flying their own flags. They are
having meetings, talking about autonomy. Some are talking about inde-
pendence. They are publicly discussing the fact that their countries were
incorporated into the Soviet Union on the basis of the Hitler-Stalin Pact
at the beginning of World War II. They are talking about the fact that
they were incorporated by force and maintained by force.
In Warsaw just last week, the government offered the Roman Cath-
olic Church unprecedented powers and freedoms in exchange for full
diplomatic recognition. The Catholic Church did not accept the offer
because of the strings attached. They want to examine those strings very
closely. But the idea that the Roman Catholic Church should be offered
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the opportunity to publish youth magazines, presumably free of censor-
ship, and sponsor youth organizations dedicated to the education of
young Catholics, is new and shocking in this society. Meanwhile, Hun-
gary made overtures to the Pope, proposing that he visit Hungary.
A Soviet literary journal published an article which explored the
Soviet military role in the World War II Katyn Forest Massacres - the
massacres in which the Polish officer corps was murdered "in cold
blood" in the forest at Katyn after the Soviet Union had conquered Po-
land. Soviet responsibility for these murders has been clear to objective
scholars, but has always been denied. But two weeks ago, a Soviet jour-
nal openly discussed the role of the Soviet military in this dastardly mas-
sacre. It was also announced in the Soviet press last week that the
writings of Leon Trotsky, of all people, were going to be published next
year as a part of the centenary celebration of Trotsky's birth. This is part
of the ongoing effort - as the article put it - to give the Soviet people a
more full and accurate picture of their past. This is what Mikhail
Gorbachev calls, "filling in the blank pages of history." It is something
very new.
In Lithuania, an archbishop who had been under house arrest for
twenty-seven years has been released and permitted to visit Rome. This
too is new and different. A Lithuanian cathedral which had been shut
for many years has been reopened, and people are now able to attend
services there. Mikhail Gorbachev gave some assurances last week to
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that he intended to free all remaining
Soviet political prisoners by next year. Now, I grant you, that there is a
problem about the definition of "political prisoner" and a question about
how many exist, but in any case, Gorbachev acknowledged that there are
some political prisoners and stated his intention to free them.
Last week we had news that Andre Sakharov would be permitted to
visit the United States. This is a man who less than three years ago was
in exile in Gorky, a closed city in the Soviet Union, and denied all con-
tact with his professional colleagues - much less foreign visitors. He
was under constant guard. This is a man who dazzled the whole world
with his courage under harsh repression. He is probably the Soviet
Union's most brilliant nuclear physicist. I believe that one of the first
signs that Gorbachev might be serious about raising some of the repres-
sion under which the Soviet people have suffered for so long was when he
ended Sakharov's exile, and permitted Sakharov to return to Moscow to
see his friends and visiting foreigners. I might say that not all foreigners
have been permitted to visit him - only foreigners who are not nuclear
physicists and who could not engage in professional conversation with
him were permitted to visit him.
When I was in the Soviet Union last year with a small group of
former officials - Cyrus Vance, Henry Kissinger, Pete Peterson, and
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Harold Brown - we had the opportunity to meet, not only with
Gorbachev, but also with Sakharov. We met with Sakharov in his apart-
ment for an evening. We were neither nuclear physicists nor nuclear
scientists, and there was no chance of any of us comprehending any tech-
nical discussions well enough to constitute any sort of potential threat.
At that point, the Soviet government was still claiming that Sakharov
could not go abroad and could not meet with visiting physicists because
he possessed "secrets." None of us was capable of understanding or
transmitting secrets of that sort in any case, and that is how we were able
to spend a very pleasant evening with him.
When we met with him, Sakharov told us that he believed Mikhail
Gorbachev was serious in his desire for change in the Soviet system. He
told us that he was not sure that Gorbachev could succeed and that there
were many problems, but that he believed that Gorbachev intended to
try to relax the heavy repression under which the Soviet people have so
long lived. He told us that articles now regularly appeared in Pravda,
Isvestia and other Soviet publications for which the authors would have
been sent to the Gulag as recently as three years before. He said that
there were still a few people in the Gulag sentenced for writing such
articles as now appear. Heavy-handed repression was being lifted in
some areas. Sakharov said he believed Gorbachev was not only their best
chance but their only chance, and that he proposed to support him
within the limits of his capacity.
Lech Walesa, another expert on repression, has had a good word to
say about Gorbachev recently. Walesa said that Poland's tragedy and
Solidarity's problem was that Brezhnev had lived too long. "Had
Brezhnev died before the heyday of the Solidarity struggle," said Walesa,
"things might have turned out differently in Poland."
Actually, I think there has been a good deal of change in Poland, as
well as in the Soviet Union in the last months. I believe that in both
countries we see something the Solidarity leadership has called the "hol-
lowing out of totalitarianism"; that it is very important, that it is new,
and that it derives above all from their acknowledgment that their eco-
nomic system is not working and apparently cannot work the way things
are currently organized. These moves which relax the iron grip of gov-
ernment on key aspects of Soviet society and culture give new meaning
and significance to Gorbachev's plans for reform. They suggest that So-
viet leaders may be ready to abandon their characteristic efforts at total
control of the society and economy, which is the distinguishing charac-
teristic of the totalitarian state.
Totalitarian governments claim the right to control all aspects of
society and to eliminate and absorb all social institutions into the state
and recognize no limits to their power nor rights against the state. Indi-
vidual rights and free association have no place at all in the totalitarian
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state. Religion has always been a special target of totalitarian govern-
ments because the governments admit no interpretation but their own of
human life, duty, conscience and destiny; they cannot tolerate competing
claims on conscience and the energy of their systems. Totalitarian gov-
ernments invariably act with special harshness against religious institu-
tions, outlawing many religious sects, closing many churches and
eliminating religious education.
The Soviet Constitution, for example, guarantees freedom of atheis-
tic and nonreligious propaganda, but no freedom of religious education.
It provides for freedom of religion but not for freedom of religious educa-
tion. Totalitarian states, the Soviet Union specifically, have imposed
heavy penalties on religious observance, including teaching Hebrew, cir-
culation of the Bible, and participation in unauthorized religious gather-
ings. If one belongs to a so-called unregistered church, which includes
almost all the Protestant churches, attending church services is a crimi-
nal offense.
Religious belief is judged incompatible with membership of the
Communist Party and membership in the Communist Party is the "open
sesame" to all good things in the Soviet Union: to the good jobs, to influ-
ence and status, and to dashas on the Volga and everything else that
makes life pleasant in the Soviet Union. The penalties for religious obser-
vance have been harsh. This history makes the present era extremely
interesting. The Soviet government, which had so recently outlawed ed-
ucation in Judaism, has now announced that it will establish an institute
for the study of Judaism, make available its archives on Jewish history,
and make available the teaching of Hebrew. Similarly, the Polish gov-
ernment has formally recognized the right of the Catholic Church in Po-
land to publish magazines for youth organizations. In fact, the right to
organize youth - that is a big departure.
These are all moves toward something which some people call plu-
ralism. I do not believe it is pluralism yet, but these moves suggest to me
that it may prove possible to transform totalitarian states peaceably from
within, and that the very first steps of such a transformation may be
underway.
Why is this happening? I believe that the Soviet leaders' attempt to
reform the system is not inspired by some noble, sudden realization that
the system is too harsh, repressive or poorly regarded abroad. Rather
they have come to realize what the Communist governments of Eastern
Europe and China also have concluded: that as an economic system,
Communism simply does not work. Quite literally, it cannot produce the
goods. The steady and continuing deterioration of the Soviet economy
has become so bad that some hard facts had to be faced by a leader as
intelligent, dynamic and realistic as Mikhail Gorbachev.
A second important factor which also involves some fact-facing, is
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the persistence of strong nationalist feelings among the ethnic minorities
in the Soviet Union and the people of Eastern Europe outside the Soviet
Union. Kazakhs want to be Kazakhs, Armenians want to be Armenians,
Estonians want to be Estonians, and so forth; they are not satisfied with
being Soviet. In 1981, we had the slogan, "Let Poland be Poland." Since
then, almost everybody, including General Jarulzelski, has come to real-
ize that nobody can prevent the Poles from being Poles. They will be
Poles, and they can shut down the Gdansk shipyards, as I heard this
morning they have decided to do. This persistence and intensification of
ethnic identification is a principle source of change. I would like to look
a little at each of the two factors.
Mikhail Gorbachev is an interesting man for a good many reasons.
He is a modern man. An interesting fact about Mikhail Gorbachev is
that he took the initiative to travel on a vacation outside of the Soviet
Union that almost no Soviet apparatchiki ever did. Fifteen to twenty
years ago, he and his wife, Raisa, drove through France and Italy on
vacation with another couple of apparatchiki. He has been outside the
Soviet Union on other occasions. He has been in trade missions to West-
ern Europe, though he has been more often in Eastern Europe. Wher-
ever he has gone, he has obviously sharpened a conception of a modern
society, which is something different from what they have in the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Gorbachev has apparently concluded that the kind of total con-
trol over economics and culture and politics that has existed in the Soviet
Union from Joseph Stalin's time, maybe Lenin's, to ours is incompatible
with the requirements of the information age. In Soviet society everyone
works for the government and is organized into an interlocking bureau-
cracy with decisions made at the top. I think Gorbachev has discovered
that that method of organizing society and decision-making leads to stag-
nation, not to production and modernization.
I think he also believes that without modern technology - the tech-
nology of the information age; the computer, the microchip, instant tele-
communications - it is impossible for the Soviet Union to compete
either militarily or economically with the West, much less to fulfill its
own leaders' dreams representing the future. Most Eastern Europeans
and observers of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who know Com-
munists well, will tell you that all Communist leaders carry in their
bosoms a real belief that they are the dream of the future. But how can
you be the dream of the future if you cannot even keep up with the
present?
Mr. Gorbachev has understood that the information age requires an
end to the total monopoly over information and skills. Read his books;
listen to his speeches. He means to end the monopoly of decision-making
at the top of the system with decisions moving only downward. He pro-
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poses more decentralized economic decision-making and more sharing of
control over information and communication. The leadership in the So-
viet Union will have to dilute its control or else renounce some of its
claims to be the future.
Some people believe that Mr. Gorbachev has been influenced by the
Hungarian model. In Hungary, as in East Germany, closer ties existed
with Western Europe and industrialization was further advanced than in
the Soviet Union when they were incorporated under Soviet control at
the end of World War II. In Hungary, where more people know the
West better, there has been a further move toward the incorporation of
elements of market economics into their economic system. In Hungary,
the shops are filled with goods, and the lines are not so long because the
country is a more productive. There are more goods to be distributed
than in other Communist countries. Mr. Gorbachev saw this prosperity,
and doubtless saw the experiments, permitting a little opposition to de-
velop to the government. There was actually a candidate who ran for a
seat in the parliament in the name of an opposition party, not much of a
party I grant you, but he was elected. It was not much of a victory for an
opposition, but the idea of opposition was planted and accepted in Hun-
gary, as were the ideas of sharing information, decentralizing decision-
making down to lower levels and consulting more with the people who
were actually in workplaces and engaged in industrial production.
These ideas took root in Hungary and were also taking root in
China. Noticing what neighboring countries were doing and what the
Chinese were doing outside the People's Republic of China - in Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and other countries - Deng Xiaoping made re-
forms which incorporated some element of "capitalism." (We call it free
enterprise or a market economy; they call it capitalism.) The Chinese
had made a marvelous discovery about four years ago that people
worked harder when they could hope to profit from their labor. They
called this discovery the "responsibility principle," and set about apply-
ing it in agriculture. The predictable happened; people worked harder
and better when they had could hope to profit from their labor. The
Chinese experienced the kind of progress one sees in Hungary or in the
private plots of Poland.
Mr. Gorbachev has not abandoned his fundamental belief in either
Marxism, Leninism or Socialism, but he has planned reforms which he
calls "new thinking." The limits of this new thinking are unclear. It is
most fully described in Mr. Gorbachev's book Perestroika. The book ex-
amines what the Soviets can do to mobilize their society to create a mod-
em, economic, information-age economy and states Soviet orientations to
the world. In Perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev says that he seeks a more effi-
cient kind of socialism. He seeks a modem society from which laziness,
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slovenliness and especially the backwardness characteristic of the Soviet
Union today is overcome.
Mr. Gorbachev wants the Soviets to sober up. He shut down many
of the state liquor stores, creating long lines for vodka. But his policies in
the ield showed him to be a man who can compromise, as well. "Moon-
shine" establishments developed faster than controls over state liquor
stores. The state lost revenues without diminishing alcohol consump-
tion. Some of the stores which had been shut down have been permitted
to reopen.
Gorbachev is also trying to persuade the Soviet people to show up
for work and work harder. He thinks there is much too much absentee-
ism, and he thinks the Soviets do not work as hard as they used to. (I do
not know anybody anywhere who thinks people in their society work as
hard as they "used to.") He wants to mobilize the Soviet people to work
as hard as the Japanese or the Koreans or, in his view, as hard as they
"used to."
The new thinking is designed to create this more efficient kind of
socialism and make the Soviet Union a socialist society that fulfills the
revolution. In Perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev writes, "[I]t is a revolution, a
decisive acceleration of the socio-economic and cultural development of
Soviet society which involves radical changes. It is a jump forward in the
development of socialism." He seeks a better socialism, a kind of social-
ism that does not exist anyplace. Its achievement will be the revolution
the Communists have always been seeking.
In Perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev also writes about the new thinking
applied to foreign policy, but he does not write much about it. Mr.
Gorbachev is straightforward about his distaste for the United States and
the American system. He sees the United States as a military/industrial
complex in which it hardly matters who wins elections because the mili-
tary/industrial complex rules. The same munition makers are always in
charge. During my meeting with him, much to the surprise of everyone
present, he attacked Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown, both of whom had
served Jimmy Carter's administration loyally. Gorbachev said relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union had been developing
better until the military/industrial complex got the ear of Carter, Vance
and Brown, who then increased the military budget, boycotted the Olym-
pics and embargoed U.S. grain - violating contracts with the Soviet
Union - and reinstated the Cold War. Gorbachev did not mention the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when he described this deterioration of
relations. It did not exist. He blamed the deterioration and the arms
buildup that began near the end of the Carter Administration on the
"'caveman" mentality of the United States in its dealings with the world.
What motivates the U.S. war-like mentality is the nationalism, chauvin-
ism and narrow-minded parochialism of Americans.
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The new thinking does not necessarily bring with it friendliness to-
wards the United States. On the other hand, it does bring significant
changes in the Soviet Union. Among those changes are the "filling in the
blank pages" of history and the economic reforms already mentioned. It
is extremely interesting that Mr. Gorbachev perceives a relationship be-
tween modernization of the Soviet Union and some kind of truth-telling
about the Soviet past. It is interesting and significant. He thinks that the
United States cannot make much progress until they have corrected the
"lies" planted at the foundation of the system and protected by force. So
Mr. Gorbachev has been trying to rectify some of the entrenched
mythology.
He appointed a commission to investigate the guilt of Nikolai
Buckharin. Buckharin was one of the original Bolsheviks, one of Lenin's
comrades along with Leon Trotsky. He was one of those most active in
bringing Communism to the Soviet Union. He helped Lenin make the
revolution. Then, under Joseph Stalin, he was tried in an open show
trial, found guilty and executed. Mr. Gorbachev organized a commission
which reinvestigated the proceedings against Buckharin. This Soviet
Communist Party commission formally announced that it was overturn-
ing the verdict of treason against Buckharin, that declarations of
Buckharin's guilt would be expunged. Moreover, the Soviet press re-
ported the following week, that Buckharin not only had not been guilty
of treason, but had played quite a constructive role in the Bolshevik
Revolution. It stated also that Buckharin had some rather good ideas
about agriculture and the reincorporation of some elements of capitalism
into the Soviet economy - which turned out to be rather like the ideas of
Mikhail Gorbachev.
At about the same time, Brezhnev came under increasing criticism.
Then, two interesting events occurred during the same weekend. First,
Mr. Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union intended to negotiate
withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan - withdrawal is now about
half completed. Secondly, Brezhnev's statue disappeared from the
square in Moscow on which it stood.
The news that the Soviet Union will actually publish Trotsky's writ-
ings is even more dramatic than the rehabilitation of Buckharin, since
Trotsky has been the arch villain in Soviet demonology since Joseph Sta-
lin's era. Even Nikita Kruschev, during his period of great reforms, did
not try to rehabilitate either Buckharin or Trotsky. Trotsky has not been
formally rehabilitated, but several publications have printed his name,
which means he is a person, not an unperson. Some have even referred
to his contributions to the Bolshevik Revolution. One even referred to
the fact that he had worked alongside Lenin, and that is about the best
one could do in the Soviet Union, as Lenin is the supreme reference fig-
ure. In every office there is a picture or likeness of Lenin. To have been
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a comrade, to have worked alongside or to have helped Lenin is to be
already a long way toward rehabilitation.
Where is it all going? How far will it go? What is Mr. Gorbachev
willing to do? What is he not willing to do? What does it mean for the
United States? We should begin by respecting Mr. Gorbachev as a skill-
ful man - not a friend, not someone whom we can trust - but a very
skillful, intelligent, vigorous and dynamic man, who "plays the whole
board." He operates throughout the whole world simultaneously: China,
South Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, North America,
Europe.
There is no reason to suppose that he is interested in democratiza-
tion Western-style. He has told us again and again that when he talks
about democratization, he does not mean Western-style democratization.
He has told us that he means Soviet-style democratization and that that
means participation in decision-making by those directly involved. It
means some decentralization of decision-making, but it does not mean an
opposition party, shared power or competition elections.
In Perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev states without embarrassment that
he does not expect an opposition party to develop in the Soviet Union,
because there is no opposition in the Soviet Union. It is interesting to
note, however, that last week there were negative votes in the Central
Committee and the Supreme Soviet. Not many, just a few negative votes.
Their existence suggests that it is legitimate to disagree with the majority
in the Soviet Union. You can permit disagreement with the majority,
providing the majority is big enough, and disagreement will not have
much effect. There is no evidence so far that Mr. Gorbachev believes any
reforms he advocates require sharing political power.
The evidence so far suggests that Mr. Gorbachev believes that it will
be possible to relax some heavy-handed repression and expand participa-
tion at lower levels so that people are not afraid to think independently.
Sharing information at lower levels, as well as at middle and upper levels,
is a form of pluralism. Permitting people to go to church if they wish
and permitting them to pursue artistic and journalistic and literary enter-
prises is a type of cultural pluralism.
Recently, for example, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was invited to join a
literary committee in the Soviet Union. He turned down the invitation,
stating he could not join a committee in the Soviet Union as long as he
could not travel to the country because of his outstanding indictment for
treason. But the fact that he was invited means that there is the begin-
ning of freedom for writers to write outside of narrowly circumscribed
orthodoxy. Mr. Gorbachev believes that he can loosen the controls and
permit some pluralism in social and economic affairs without significant
sharing of political power over the society.
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In Poland, Lech Walesa has distinguished three kinds of pluralism:
social pluralism, which he says is freedom to join organizations which are
not controlled by the state (which you do not have to join because you
are told to); economic pluralism, which permits some labor unions, like
Solidarity, to operate within workplaces without government authoriza-
tion or organization; and political pluralism, which permits opposition
political parties to develop and function. Walesa has suggested that the
government in Poland can permit economic and social pluralism now
without permitting political pluralism, which he believes lies in the fu-
ture. There is certainly nothing Mikhail Gorbachev has said or done to
suggest that he is willing to accept political pluralism, but the sharing of
power in social and economic decision making is a step forward.
What else does Mr. Gorbachev want? He obviously wants a higher
degree of legitimacy - a better reputation for the Soviet Union in the
rest of the world. The Polish and Hungarian governments are also seek-
ing greater legitimacy. The issue between the Polish government and
Solidarity is legitimacy. Two weeks ago, the Polish government offered
to meet with Solidarity and formally recognize it as a legitimate trade
union movement, provided the representatives from Solidarity would rec-
ognize the legitimacy of the Polish government or as they call it, "respect
the constitutional order," and accept the fact that the Communist Party
has the right to rule. It is very simple. All they have to do is agree to
respect the constitutional order. The last talks between the Polish gov-
ernment and Solidarity broke down because Solidarity's delegation con-
tained two people who are clear opponents of the idea that the
Communist Party has the right to rule; namely, Jascek and Adam
Michnik.
In its search for legitimacy, the Polish government has agreed to
respect the rights of the Church, with regard to religious education of
youth. The Church will respect the constitutional order - that is to say,
accept the legitimacy of the government of the Communist Party of Po-
land. The issue of legitimacy is extremely important to Mikhail
Gorbachev, General Jaruzelski and to various other Communist leaders
today. It is part of their plan for playing a new and more important role
in the world.
Mr. Gorbachev has written and has said to the Central Committee,
the Congress of the Communist Party and others that he is withdrawing
from Afghanistan because the continued Soviet war in Afghanistan has
negative effects on Soviet policy and diplomatic affairs throughout the
world. He is right. How can he persuade the countries of Western Eu-
rope and Southern Asia that the Soviet Union is not a threat if the Soviet
Union is using force against a less powerful neighbor on its border? Mr.
Gorbachev claims his goal is to persuade the world that the Soviet Union
is not a threat, that there is no Soviet threat and that the world does not
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need to be armed against the Soviet threat. In order to persuade the
world that it does not need to be armed against the Soviet threat, the
Soviet Union cannot use force to impose its will. It must be a govern-
ment like the others of the world, with a constitutional order that one
can respect.
This pursuit of legitimacy explains why Mr. Gorbachev said it is
unthinkable that the Soviet Union would use force against a socialist
country. In this declaration he seems to renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine
under which the Soviet Union reserves the right to intervene with force if
socialism is threatened within any socialist country or if such a country
appears likely to break with the Socialist World System, that is, Soviet
control. In fact, Mr. Gorbachev has not really renounced the Brezhnev
Doctrine, he has sounded as if he has renounced it. Neither he nor the
Polish government has ever renounced their claim to a monopoly of
power, nor agreed to the legitimacy of political opposition. If the Com-
munist Party has the sole right to govern, then any opposition that
threatens their government is illegitimate opposition.
Mr. Yakolev, Mr. Gorbachev's "right-hand man" who has recently
been put in charge of foreign affairs inside the Politburo, said in an inter-
view with the New York Times that it was unthinkable that Latvia, Lith-
uania, Estonia or the Ukraine should speak of being independent or
imagine they could have a currency of their own. (The Estonians have
been speaking of things.) Yakolev noted that California does not have a
currency of its own, as though he did not really understand that Califor-
nia had asked to be a member of the United States and that Estonia never
had asked to be a member of the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, we are seeing new departures and less heavy-handed
repression in the life of the Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian people.
We are also seeing a new Soviet opening toward Western Europe which
could well change U.S. relations with Western Europe and result in the
dismantling of NATO. That, I think, is clearly Gorbachev's aim.
I do not want to end this address without noting that some of the
implications for Western Europe of the new, less repressive Soviet Union
are already clear. Relations between the Soviet Union and our closest
allies in Western Europe have already improved. West German Chancel-
lor Helmut Kohl signed some thirty accords with Mr. Gorbachev during
his most recent visit. Those accords are in a wide variety of fields, from
nuclear reactors to kidney machines, dental equipment to bulldozers.
Accords were signed on energy and space technology, environmental
protection, avoiding accidents at sea, and on farming and cultural ex-
change and cooperation in Middle European affairs. Meanwhile, the
West German government announced a new $3 billion loan to the Soviet
Union. Our best friends have provided some $7 billion in new credits to
the Soviet Union in the last three months. They are forging tighter eco-
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nomic links, closer economic ties, and creating new problems for con-
trolling technology transfer.
It is a whole new world; as Adam said to Eve, a "time of transition."
Thank you very much.

